# 艾索斯生物辨識身分、憑證與驗證法

- Code: `P1-04`
- Wave: `2`
- Slug: `biometric-identity-credential-authentication`

## 完整法律全文（AI 版）

本文件與中文 Human reader 共用同一公開法律內容。

Authority
L2 specialized identity/authentication law under Constitutional Supremacy, Identity Law, Evidence Code, Data/Cognitive Privacy law, and approved IBLAS / Globe ID technical baseline.

Core rule
Identity Match ≠ Liveness ≠ Authorization.

PART I｜LEGAL EFFECT

1. Identity Proof
authentication can support a legal identity claim but does not create personhood.

2. Liveness
liveness proves current live capture under a defined assurance profile; it does not itself prove authorization.

3. Authorization
transaction/action authority remains separate and purpose/scope/time limited.

PART II｜ASSURANCE

4. IBLAS Profiles
Legal systems may incorporate BLA-0–BLA-6 profiles by reference; legal effect must pin version/profile.

5. High-Risk Minimum
high-value financial, identity recovery, civic/critical actions may require higher assurance.

6. Terminal Attestation
high-assurance results require trusted capture chain where the adopted profile says so.

7. Anti-Downgrade
system may not silently represent degraded authentication as full assurance.

PART III｜RECOVERY & ALTERNATIVE PATHS

8. Recovery Separation
credential recovery is not ordinary transaction authorization.

9. Alternative Verification
injury, disability, atypical physiology, sensor failure or lawful non-enrollment requires an alternative lawful route.

10. Failure ≠ Guilt
authentication failure does not itself prove fraud, crime, impersonation or incapacity.

11. Degraded Mode
offline/emergency modes must disclose assurance downgrade, limit actions and create later audit.

PART IV｜FORK / MERGE / SUCCESSOR

12. Fork Credential Divergence
Forks do not indefinitely share high-assurance credentials after independent legal identity.

13. Merge Reissuance
Merge requires credential review/reissuance; old credentials are not automatically combined.

14. Successor
successor status does not imply predecessor authentication token or biometric right transfers.

PART V｜BIOMETRIC DATA RIGHTS

15. Template ≠ Raw Signal
systems should minimize raw biometric/neural retention when a template/verification result suffices.

16. Purpose Limitation
enrollment for identity does not automatically authorize medical inference, emotion inference, training or unrelated surveillance.

17. Revocation / Compromise
credential compromise must support suspension, reissuance, downstream propagation and immutable audit.

18. No Hidden Fallback
legacy terminal/recovery path cannot be a hidden bypass to higher assurance.

PART VI｜EVIDENCE & AUDIT

19. Authentication Evidence
result should record profile/version, capture time, terminal identity, degraded state, decision, relevant failure class and audit event.

20. Dispute
a person may challenge false match, false non-match, bad terminal, wrong profile, credential history and downgrade event.